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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 Karen Capato conceived twin children through in vitro 
fertilization after her husband’s death.  Ms. Capato applied for Social 
Security surviving child’s insurance benefits for the twins.  However, 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied the application.  
Ms. Capato brought this action for review of the SSA’s denial of her 
application for surviving child’s insurance benefits under the Social 
Security Act.  The United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey affirmed the SSA’s decision, and Ms. Capato appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  The Third 
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, in part, and vacated the 
decision, in part.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Upon 
review, the Supreme Court held that because the twin children could 
not inherit from the decedent under Florida’s intestacy laws, they 
were not entitled to Social Security survivors benefits.  Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court determined that the provisions of the Social 
Security Act, which the SSA asserted governed the determination of 
the status of posthumously conceived children, met the standards of 
rational basis review.  Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Third 
Circuit’s decision, in part, and remanded the case. 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
 Karen and Robert Capato married in 1999; however, Robert died 
of cancer in 2002.1  At his death, Mr. Capato resided in Florida, and 
his will, executed in Florida, provided for the son born of his 
marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage.2  The 
will did not include any provisions for children conceived after his 
death.3  Shortly after Mr. Capato’s death, Karen Capato began in 
                                                          
1 Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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vitro fertilization using her husband’s frozen sperm, and eighteen 
months after Robert Capato’s death, Karen Capato gave birth to 
twins.4  Karen Capato then filed a claim for survivors’ insurance 
benefits on behalf of the twins; however, the Social Security 
Administration denied her application.5  The United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the SSA’s decision.6  
The District Court determined that the twins would qualify for 
survivor’s insurance benefits only if they were entitled to inherit from 
the deceased wage earner, their father Mr. Capato, under state 
intestacy laws.7  As Robert Capato died domiciled in Florida, Florida 
intestacy laws applied.  Under Florida law, posthumously born 
children may inherit through intestate succession only if the child is 
conceived during the decedent’s lifetime.8  The district court 
concluded that because the twins were conceived after Robert 
Capato’s death, they could not inherit from their father under state 
intestacy laws; and, therefore, they also did not qualify for survivor’s 
insurance benefits.9  Karen Capato appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  The Third Circuit reversed 
the district court’s decision, holding that “‘the undisputed biological 
children of a deceased wage earner and his widow’ qualify for 
survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law.’”10  In order 
to resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.   
 Section 402(d) of the Social Security Act states, “every child of a 
deceased insured individual shall be entitled to child’s insurance 
benefit[s].”11  However, the Supreme Court had to determine whether 
the Capato twins qualified as children of the deceased insured under 
the Social Security Act.12  In order to address this question, the 
Supreme Court specifically looked to two sections of the Social 
                                                          
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 2027. 
11 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2027; see also 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2012). 
12 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. 
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Security Act, section 416(e) and section 416(h)(2)(a).13  Section 
416(e) defines the term child as “the child or legally adopted child of 
an individual.”14  However, section 416(h)(2)(a) states that, when 
determining whether an applicant is the child of an insured 
individual, the “Commissioner of Social Security shall apply the 
intestacy law of the insured individual’s domiciliary State.”15  The 
SSA argued that section 416(h)(2)(a) clarified the definition of child 
offered in section 416(e), and thus section 416(h)(2)(a) governed the 
meaning of the term child when dealing with applicants for insurance 
benefits.16  On the other hand, Karen Capato, on behalf of her twin 
children, argued that the Supreme Court should adopt the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation of the Social Security Act, of which section 
416(e) controlled the meaning of the term child.17  The Supreme 
Court evaluated both the SSA’s and the Third Circuit’s arguments 
and ultimately determined that the SSA’s interpretation of the Social 
Security Act was more persuasive.18 
 In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court first evaluated the 
Third Circuit’s decision that section 416(e)’s definition of child 
governed which applicants were entitled to insurance benefits.19  The 
Third Circuit asserted that section 416(h)(2)(a) only governs when a 
child’s family status needs to be determined; and, as there was no 
family status to determine in this case, section 416(e)’s definition of 
child must govern.20  The Supreme Court recognized that family 
status was not at issue in this case as there was no question that the 
twins were the biological children of Robert and Karen Capato.21  
However, the Supreme Court looked to the language of the Social 
Security Act and the intent of Congress to determine that section 
416(h)(2)(a) was intended to compliment and further clarify section 
                                                          
13 Id. at 2027–28. 
14 Id. at 2027; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) (2012). 
15 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2028; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(a) (2012). 
16 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2028. 
17 Id. at 2029. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2029. 
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416(e)’s vague definition of child.22  Section 416(h)(2)(a) specifically 
refers to “this subchapter,” and this reference includes both section 
402(d) and section 416(e).23  Thus, the Supreme Court determined 
that Congress intended section 416(h)(2)(a) to provide a “plain and 
explicit instruction on how the determination of child status should 
be made.”24  Furthermore, the Court also found that the Social 
Security Act commonly refers to state law for matters of family 
status as seen with the Act’s reference to state law to define such 
terms as wife, widow, or parent of an insured individual.25  
Therefore, the Court held that requiring all “child” applicants to 
qualify as children of the insured decedent under state intestacy law 
created a simple and clear test that ensured benefits for those plainly 
contemplated by Congress and avoided congressional entanglement 
in state-law family relations.26 
 The Court also determined that using section 416(h)(2)(a)’s 
definition of  “child” furthers the purpose of the Social Security Act.  
Congress’s intent with the Act was to create a program that would 
provide “dependent members of a wage earners family with 
protection against the hardships occasioned by the loss of the 
insured’s earnings.”27  If a child can take personal property from the 
deceased’s estate under state intestacy laws, the Court determined 
that it is reasonable to assume the child will more likely be dependent 
during the parent’s life and at the parent’s death.28  Thus, the state 
intestacy laws help to further the overall purpose of the Social 
Security Act.29 
 Finally, the Supreme Court addressed Karen Capato’s 
constitutional claim.  Mrs. Capato asserted that the SSA’s 
interpretation of the Act raised equal protection and due process 
concerns because their interpretation treated posthumously conceived 
children as an “inferior subset of natural children who are ineligible 
                                                          
22 Id. at 2030–31. 
23 Id. at 2031. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2031. 
27 Id. at 2032. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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for government benefits.”30  Just as the Third Circuit had previously 
rejected this argument, the Supreme Court also rejected this claim.  
The Court applied rational basis review, as this case did not involve 
illegitimate children of unwed parents, but only posthumously 
conceived children.31  Under rational basis review, the SSA’s 
interpretation of the Social Security Act must be reasonably related to 
the government’s interests.32  Here, the government’s interests are to 
reserve benefits to those children who have lost a parent’s support 
and to minimize the administrative burden of proving dependency on 
a case-by-case basis.33  The Supreme Court concluded that the SSA’s 
adoption of section 416(h)(2)(a) as the controlling definition of a 
“child” is reasonably related to achieving these government 
interests.34  As the SSA’s interpretation of the statute is at least 
reasonable, it is entitled to deference under the Chevron standard 
because Congress gave the SSA the authority to interpret and enforce 
the Social Security Act, and the SSA’s interpretation in this case was 
neither arbitrary nor capricious.35  Thus, the Court determined that 
there were no equal protection or due process violations in the SSA’s 
interpretation of the Social Security Act. 
 After considering all of these factors, the Supreme Court held that 
applications for child insurance benefits, as in this case, must be 
resolved in reference to state intestacy law.36  Furthermore, the 
provisions of the Social Security Act determining the status of 
posthumously conceived children passed rational basis review.37  
Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision 
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.38 
 
                                                          
30 Id. at 2033. 
31 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2033. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 2033–34. 
36 Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2034. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
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Impact: 
 
 With this case, the Supreme Court once again showed deference 
to government agency interpretation of a statute.  This deference 
reinforces the concept that courts want to avoid getting involved in 
governmental agency decisions when possible.  Furthermore, with 
this decision, the Supreme Court established a standard interpretation 
of the term child for the Social Security Act.  This allows the SSA 
and the courts to avoid having to make burdensome case-by-case 
determinations.   
 
Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 Southern Union Co. was convicted by a jury in federal court for 
violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 
(RCRA).  The jury found that Southern Union Co. had knowingly 
stored liquid mercury without a permit at a subsidiary facility.  For 
violating the RCRA, the probation office set a maximum fine of 
$38.1 million and imposed an actual fine of $6 million.  Southern 
Union Co. argued, on appeal, that by setting this maximum fine and 
imposing the actual fine, the district court engaged in judicial fact-
finding that enlarged the maximum punishment authorized for a 
particular crime, thus violating their Sixth Amendment rights.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s sentencing, holding that Apprendi does not apply to 
criminal fines.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and determined 
that Apprendi does apply to the imposition of criminal fines.  Thus, 
the Supreme Court held that, in setting the maximum potential fine 
and imposing an actual fine on Southern Union Co., the district court 
did engage in judicial fact-finding that enlarged the maximum 
punishment the defendant faced beyond what the jury’s verdict or the 
defendant’s admissions allowed. 
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Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
 Southern Union Co. is a natural gas distributor whose subsidiary 
stored liquid mercury at a facility in Rhode Island.39  In September 
2007, a grand jury indicted Southern Union Co. on multiple counts 
for violating federal environmental statutes; however, only the first 
count is relevant here.  The first count alleged that the company 
violated the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 by 
knowingly storing liquid mercury without a permit at the Rhode 
Island facility “from September 19, 2002 until on or about October 
19, 2004.”40  After a trial in the District Court of Rhode Island, a jury 
convicted Southern Union Co. of unlawfully storing liquid mercury 
“on or about September 19, 2002 to October 19, 2004.”41 
 RCRA violations are punishable by a fine of no more than 
$50,000 for each day of the violation.42  The probation office set a 
maximum fine of $38.1 million by determining that Southern Union 
Co. violated the RCRA for 762 days, from September 19, 2002 
through October 19, 2004.43  Southern Union Co. argued that this 
calculation violated Apprendi44 as the jury was not required to 
determine the precise duration of the company’s violation.45  The 
company pointed to the fact that the jury verdict form only listed an 
approximate start date for the violation and permitted a conviction if 
the jury found a violation for even one day.46  Thus, imposing a fine 
greater than the single day penalty of $50,000 required the district 
court to engage in judicial fact-finding, violating the Apprendi 
precedent.47  In response, the Government acknowledged that the 
                                                          
39 Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2349 (2012). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).  This case reserves to 
juries the determination of any fact, other than that of a prior conviction, which 
might increase a criminal defendant’s maximum potential sentence.  The case has 
been applied to multiple cases involving imprisonment or death, but has yet to be 
applied to cases involving criminal fines.  Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349. 
45 Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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jury was not required to specify the duration of the violation, but 
argued that Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines. 
 The district court held that Apprendi did apply to criminal fines, 
but upheld the sentencing because the court concluded that based on 
the content and context of the verdict the jury had found a 762-day 
violation.48  Therefore, the district court enforced a $6 million fine 
and $12 million community service obligation on Southern Union 
Co.49  The company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit.  The First Circuit rejected the district court’s 
finding that the jury necessarily found a 762-day violation, but 
upheld the sentence by concluding that Apprendi did not apply to 
criminal fines.50  As the circuit courts have reached contradictory 
conclusions on the application of Apprendi, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in order to resolve the conflict.51 
 In order to resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court had to 
consider the scope of the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial.  
Apprendi states that besides prior convictions, “any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”52  According to Apprendi, the statutory maximum 
is the maximum sentence a judge can impose based solely on the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.53  The 
Supreme Court determined that the purpose of Apprendi is to ensure 
that the jury is the one who determines the facts that warrant 
punishment for a statutory offense.54  This concern applies whether 
the sentence is a criminal fine, imprisonment, or death.55  The 
Government argued that because criminal fines are less serious 
punishments than incarceration or death, Apprendi should not 
apply.56  However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.  The 
                                                          
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349. 
51 Id. 
52 See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. 2348. 
53 Id. 
54 Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2350. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 2351. 
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Court pointed to the fact that one reason Southern Union Co. was 
properly accorded a jury trial was due to the seriousness of the 
potential punishment, the fines.57  Furthermore, the Government 
admitted that the district court made factual findings, which increased 
the potential and actual fine the court imposed.58  This judicial fact-
finding that increases the maximum punishment a defendant faces 
beyond a jury’s verdict or the defendant’s admission is precisely 
what Apprendi is intended to guard against.59 
 The Supreme Court also determined that Apprendi does not allow 
courts to distinguish between a fact that is an element of the crime 
and a fact that goes to determining the maximum sentence of a 
crime.60  These are both facts that must be determined by the jury, 
and are not subject to judicial fact-finding.  In this case, the fact that 
will ultimately determine the maximum fine that Southern Union Co. 
faces is the number of days the company was in violation of the 
RCRA.61  The Court decided that the Government must prove to the 
jury that Southern Union Co. committed the acts constituting the 
violation for each day of the alleged 762 day long violation.  By 
requiring that the jury must determine the duration of the violation, 
the Supreme Court ruled that Apprendi applies to the imposition of 
criminal fines.  The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of 
Appeals for further proceedings. 
 
Impact: 
 
 In determining that Apprendi applies to the imposition of 
criminal fines, the Supreme Court established a unified rule for 
courts to follow when evaluating whether a court has engaged in 
judicial fact-finding during the sentencing portion of a trial.  This 
ruling resolves any conflict that may have existed between the circuit 
courts on this matter.  Furthermore, this decision does not mark an 
unexpected extension of the Apprendi doctrine as most circuit courts 
have already addressed this issue and applied the doctrine to criminal 
                                                          
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 2352. 
59 Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352. 
60 Id. at 2356. 
61 Id. 
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fines.  Therefore, this decision does not mark a drastic departure from 
precedent as the Government alleged, but formally recognizes an 
already widely established application of the Apprendi doctrine to 
criminal fines. 
 
Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350 (2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 Dana Roberts petitioned for review of an order of the Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Program setting his maximum weekly rate 
for his Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 
(LHWCA) benefits at the statutory maximum rate for 2002.  Roberts 
argued that his benefits should have been based on the higher 
statutory maximum rate for 2007, as 2007 was the year in which he 
was “newly awarded compensation” by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ).  The ALJ denied reconsideration, and the Department of 
Labor’s Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision 
determining that the relevant maximum rate is determined by the date 
the disability begins.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision holding that an employee is 
newly awarded compensation under the LHWCA when the employee 
first becomes entitled to compensation.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve any conflict regarding when a workers’ 
compensation beneficiary is newly awarded compensation.  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision and held that a 
claimant is newly awarded compensation under the LHWCA when 
the employee first becomes entitled to compensation. 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
 The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provides 
compensation for the disability or death of employees who suffer an 
injury or death while working upon navigable waters of the United 
States.62  The employee’s compensation depends on the severity of 
his injury and his pre-injury pay.63  However, section 906 of the 
                                                          
62 Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1354 (2012). 
63 Id. 
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LHWCA caps benefits for most types of disability at “twice the 
national average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which an injured 
employee is newly awarded compensation.”64  In this case, the 
controversy arises over when an employee is “newly awarded 
compensation.” 
 In fiscal year 2002, Dana Roberts slipped and fell on a patch of 
ice while employed by Sea-Land Services marine terminal in Dutch 
Harbor, Alaska.65  Roberts notified Sea-Land of his injury, and Sea-
Land voluntarily paid Roberts workers’ compensation benefits 
without a compensation order until fiscal year 2005.66  After Sea-
Land discontinued paying Roberts the benefits, Roberts filed a 
LHWCA claim and Sea-Land controverted.67  After a hearing, in 
fiscal year 2007, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded 
Roberts benefits based on twice the national average weekly wage for 
fiscal year 2002, as this was the year Roberts became disabled.68  
Roberts moved for reconsideration, arguing that he was entitled to 
benefits based on the national average weekly wage for the fiscal 
year 2007, as this was the year that he was “newly awarded 
compensation” by the ALJ’s order.69  The ALJ denied 
reconsideration, and the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review 
Board affirmed the decision.70  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision holding that an employee 
is “newly awarded compensation” under section 906(c) of the 
LHWCA when the employee first becomes entitled to compensation, 
thus when the injury occurs.71  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to determine when an employee was “newly awarded compensation.” 
 Roberts argued that the phrase “awarded compensation” in 
section 906(c) of the LHWCA refers to a formal order, while Sea-
Land argued that the phrase refers to when an employee is statutorily 
entitled to compensation due to a disability and that a formal order is 
                                                          
64 Id.  See also 33 U.S.C. § 906(c) (2012). 
65 Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1355. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1355. 
71 Id. 
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not required.72  The Supreme Court determined that the language of 
section 906(c) of the LHWCA itself could be interpreted either way.  
However, after looking to the overall statutory scheme of the 
LHWCA, the Court determined that only the interpretation offered by 
Sea-Land was appropriate.73  By interpreting “awarded 
compensation” to mean “statutorily entitled to compensation because 
of disability,” the Court ensured the administrative rule would 
provide for the equal treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries and 
prevent gamesmanship in the workers’ compensation claims 
process.74   
Furthermore, the Court noted that if Roberts’ interpretation of the 
language was adopted and a formal order was required for an award, 
section 906(c) would become inapplicable to the majority of 
disability claims.75  Most employers voluntarily make payments to 
disabled employees upon notification of the disability without 
engaging in any administrative proceeding.76  Thus by interpreting 
“awarded compensation” to refer to the point at which an employee 
first becomes statutorily entitled to compensation, when the disability 
occurs, the Court ensured that employers who voluntarily paid 
benefits could calculate the compensation cap.77  To calculate this 
cap, the employers would simply look to the average weekly wage 
for the fiscal year in which the disability occurred.78  This means of 
calculation prevents employers and employees from having to resort 
to unnecessary administrative proceedings in order to receive 
compensation.  Moreover, the traditional administrative practice is to 
treat the time of the injury as the relevant date for awarding 
compensation.79  By adopting Sea-Land’s interpretation of “award 
compensation,” the Court upholds this administrative tradition. 
Finally, the Court noted that by establishing that an employee is 
“newly awarded compensation” when the employee first becomes 
                                                          
72 Id. at 1356. 
73 Id. at 1356–57. 
74 Id. 
75 Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1357. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1358–59. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1359. 
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disabled, and thus statutorily entitled to benefits, helps prevent 
employees from engaging in gamesmanship in the claims process.80  
If compensation awards were valued based on the time an ALJ 
ordered the award, then employees would likely wait until a later 
fiscal year to file the award.81  By waiting until a later fiscal year, the 
employees would likely receive higher compensation as the 
compensation cap is based on the average weekly wage for the given 
fiscal year, and this average weekly wage typically increases each 
fiscal year.  This would allow employees with similar injuries and 
pre-injury pay rates to receive different levels of compensation 
simply because of the time they filed their claims and received ALJ 
compensation orders.  The Court notes that this practice would go 
against Congress’s intent in creating the LHWCA.82  Thus, after all 
of these considerations, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate 
court’s decision and determined that an employee is “newly awarded 
compensation” when the employee first becomes disabled and thus 
statutorily entitled to benefits under the LHWCA.83  The year in 
which a compensation order is issued does not affect the calculation 
cap of the award the employee is entitled to.84 
 
Impact: 
 
 With this decision, the Supreme Court prevented similarly 
situated disabled employees from receiving disparate treatment when 
determining what statutory maximum rate of compensation the 
employees were entitled to.  This decision also discourages disabled 
employees from engaging in gamesmanship when filing disability 
claims.  Furthermore, this case prevents unnecessary administrative 
proceedings, as it does not allow employees to file disability claims 
years later in an attempt to increase their award.  The decision 
protects employers, who voluntarily pay disability claims when the 
disability initially occurs, from being subject to higher rates from a 
compensation order filed years later. 
                                                          
80 Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1359, 1363. 
81 Id. at 1359–60. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1363. 
84 Id. 
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Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 The Sacketts received a compliance order from the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) alleging that their parcel of 
land was subject to the Clean Water Act (CWA).  The compliance 
order further alleged that by filling about a half acre of their property 
with dirt and rock the Sacketts had violated the CWA.  The order 
required that the Sacketts restore the property in accordance with the 
EPA’s Restoration Work Plan and provide the EPA with access to all 
of their records and documents regarding the parcel.  The Sacketts 
brought a civil action against the EPA seeking an injunction and 
declaratory relief.  The United States District Court for the District of 
Idaho dismissed the matter, and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.  The Supreme Court determined 
that the EPA’s compliance order was a final agency action for which 
there was no other adequate remedy other than Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) review.  Furthermore, the Court determined 
that the CWA did not prevent this APA review.   
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
 The Clean Water Act prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by 
any person, without a permit into the ‘navigable waters’ of the United 
States.”85  If the Environmental Protection Agency determines that 
any person is in violation of the CWA, the EPA can issue a 
compliance order or initiate civil enforcement action.86  If the EPA 
prevails in a civil action, the CWA allows the EPA to impose a civil 
penalty of $37,500 per day of the violation.87  However, if an 
individual has been issued a compliance order but fails to comply, 
and the EPA prevails in a civil action, the civil penalty may be 
increased to $75,000 per day of the violation.88   
                                                          
85 Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369–70 (2012); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1311, 1344 (2012). 
86 Id. at 1370.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
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 The Sacketts owned a residential parcel of land in Idaho.89  The 
parcel lied just north of Priest Lake, but was separated from the lake 
by several lots containing permanent structures.90  In preparation for 
building a house on the parcel, the Sacketts filled in part of their 
parcel with rock and dirt.91  A few months after this filling, the 
Sacketts received a compliance order from the EPA alleging that the 
Sacketts had violated the CWA.  The order asserted that (1) the 
Sacketts’ parcel contained wetlands; (2) these wetlands are adjacent 
to Priest Lake, and Priest Lake is a navigable water of the United 
States under the CWA, (3) the Sacketts discharged fill material into 
the wetlands site, filling approximately one half acre; and (4) filling 
this area constituted a violation of the CWA, as the Sacketts 
discharged pollutants into waters of the United States without a 
permit.92  The EPA’s compliance order required that the Sacketts 
immediately take steps to restore the site in accordance with an EPA 
created Restoration Work Plan, and required the Sacketts to turn over 
all records and documents concerning the site to the EPA.93 
 The Sacketts did not believe their parcel was subject to the CWA, 
and thus asked the EPA for a hearing.94  Their request for a hearing 
was denied, and the Sacketts brought this action in the District Court 
for the District of Idaho seeking an injunction and declaratory 
relief.95  The District Court dismissed their claim for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, and the Unites States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed concluding that the CWA “precludes 
preenforcement judicial review of compliance orders, and that such 
preclusion does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s due process 
guarantee.”96  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but declined to 
consider the scope of what constitutes “navigable waters” subject to 
the CWA.97  Instead, the Court limited its review to whether the 
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compliance order was a final agency decision thus subjecting the 
order to judicial review under Chapter 7 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.98 
 There was no dispute that the compliance order was an agency 
action; however, the question remained whether the action was 
final.99  The Court first concluded that the order determined the 
Sacketts’ rights and obligations.  Under the order, the Sacketts had a 
legal obligation to restore their property according to the EPA 
generated and approved Restoration Work Plan, and had the legal 
obligation to turn over all records and documents related to the fill 
site.100  In addition to these legal obligations, the compliance order 
also subjected the Sacketts to legal consequences.  The order allows 
the Government to potentially impose a penalty of up to $75,000 per 
day of the violation if the Government pursues future enforcement 
proceedings.101  Furthermore, the order severely limits the Sacketts’ 
ability to get a permit for their actions from the Army Corps of 
Engineers, as the Army Corps of Engineers will not process a permit 
application until any EPA compliance issues are resolved.102   
 The Court then looked to the issuance of the order in relation to 
the EPA’s decision-making process.  The Court determined that the 
issuance of a compliance order marked the end of the EPA’s 
decision-making process.103  As exemplified by the denial of the 
Sacketts’ request for a hearing, the findings and conclusions of a 
compliance order are not subject to further agency review.104  The 
fact that the Sacketts could engage in informal discussion with the 
EPA regarding the terms of the order was not sufficient to “make an 
otherwise final agency action nonfinal.”105  Moreover, the APA 
requires that the person seeking “APA review of the final agency 
action have ‘no other adequate remedy in court.’”106  Typically in 
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CWA enforcement cases judicial review occurs as a result of a civil 
action brought by the EPA.107  However, the Sacketts, in this case, 
would have to wait for the EPA to initiate a civil action before having 
an opportunity for judicial review.108  Thus, each day that the EPA 
does not file a civil action, the Sacketts become potentially liable for 
additional fines associated with violating the compliance order.   
 The Supreme Court then reviewed the Government’s argument 
that, under section 701(a)(1) of the APA, the CWA qualified as a 
statute that specifically precluded judicial review and thus excludes 
APA review of the compliance order.109  The Court rejected this 
argument concluding that the APA intends to provide judicial review 
for all final agency actions, especially when these agency actions are 
not subject to further review mechanisms.110  The Court further 
acknowledged that by allowing judicial review of final agency 
actions, such as compliance orders, the EPA might be less inclined to 
use compliance orders, as the orders would no longer encourage 
voluntary compliance.111  However, the Court determined that 
efficiency was not sufficient to overcome the APA’s presumptions of 
allowing judicial review for final agency action.112  After all of these 
considerations, the Supreme Court determined that the EPA’s 
compliance order, issued to the Sacketts, constituted a final agency 
action for which APA review is the only adequate remedy available, 
and that the CWA does not preclude this review.113 
 
Impact: 
 
 This decision provides recipients of final agency actions, 
specifically EPA issued compliance orders, with a means of 
obtaining judicial review.  This is particularly important for 
recipients such as the Sacketts who would have continued to accrue 
potential liability fines until the agency, the EPA, initiated a civil 
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action.  Thus, this decision provides compliance order recipients with 
an alternative option, judicial review, instead of forcing them to 
choose to voluntarily comply or simply wait for the EPA to take civil 
action.  Furthermore, with this decision, the Supreme Court firmly 
established that the APA places greater importance on the fairness of 
the process than efficiency in the process. 
 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL 
 
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d. 403 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 Spirit Airlines, in conjunction with other airlines, petitioned for 
review of the Department of Transportation (DOT) final rule 
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections.  The DOT issued this rule 
pursuant to its authority to regulate unfair and deceptive practices in 
the airline industry.  The airlines challenged three provisions of the 
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections rule—the Airline 
Advertising Rule, the Refund Rule, and the Post Purchase Price Rule.  
The airlines alleged that the provisions violated their right to free 
speech, and that the provisions were arbitrary and capricious under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that all three provisions 
were reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious under the APA.  The 
D.C. Circuit also found that the Airfare Advertising Rule did not 
deprive the airlines of First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech, that the Refund Rule did not violate the Airline Deregulation 
Act, and that the Post Purchase Price Rule was procedurally lawful.  
Thus, the D.C. Circuit denied the airlines petition for review of the 
DOT’s final rule Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections. 
 
Facts, Analysis, Ruling: 
 
 Despite Congress passing the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, 
the Department of Transportation retained the authority to regulate 
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and prohibit unfair and deceptive practices in the airline industry.114  
The DOT exercised this authority by issuing a final rule entitled 
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections.115  Spirit Airlines, and 
other airlines, challenged three of the provisions under this final 
rule—the Airline Advertising Rule, the Refund Rule, and the Post 
Purchase Price Rule.116  The Airline Advertising Rule required that 
total, final prices for airline fares be the most prominent price figure 
displayed.117  The Refund Rule required that airlines must allow 
passengers to cancel reservations without penalty for twenty-four 
hours if the reservation was made one week or more before the 
flight’s departure.118  Finally, the Post Purchase Price Rule prohibited 
airlines from increasing the price of seats, passenger baggage, or fuel 
surcharge after the air transportation had been purchased, except in 
the case of an increase in a government-imposed tax or fee.119  Spirit 
Airlines, and other airlines, challenged all three of these provisions as 
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, and 
then specifically alleged that the Airlines Advertising Rule violated 
airlines’ First Amendment right to engage in commercial and 
political speech.120  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia took the airlines’ petition for review under 
review to examine these challenges. 
 The D.C. Circuit began by looking at the challenge to the Airfare 
Advertising Rule.  The airlines asserted that there is nothing 
deceptive about listing the taxes of airline fares separately from the 
total price, and that the DOT lacked sufficient evidence to conclude 
this was a deceptive practice.121  The airlines alleged that as the DOT 
lacked sufficient evidence, this rule was arbitrary and capricious, 
especially considering that in 2006 the DOT had reaffirmed its policy 
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of allowing base-fare advertising.122  The D.C. Circuit, however, was 
not persuaded by the airlines’ argument.  In 1984, the DOT passed a 
rule requiring airlines’ advertised prices for air transportation to state 
the total price the consumer would have to pay, including taxes.123  
The disputed Airline Advertising Rule did not substantially alter this 
1984 DOT rule, but only added language requiring that the total price 
be the most prominently advertised price.124  The D.C. Circuit noted 
that the airlines never challenged the original 1984 rule, and thus the 
circuit court only had to consider whether the DOT acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously when the DOT enforced the 1984 rule by passing 
the Airline Advertising Rule.125   
Government agencies are afforded substantial deference when 
interpreting their own regulations.126  Therefore, unless the DOT’s 
interpretation of the regulation was plainly erroneous or inconsistent, 
the Airline Advertising Rule would be considered a reasonable 
interpretation of the DOT’s authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive 
practices.  The DOT relied on comments from the original 1984 
rulemaking, about 500 comments from a 2006 hearing explaining 
how consumers were confused by advertised itemized pricing rather 
than one total price, and feedback from a DOT online forum known 
as the Regulation Room.127  Through this evidence, the DOT 
concluded that consumers were being deceived by airlines 
advertising lower price quotes that did not reflect the total cost of 
travel.128  Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit determined that nothing in 
the Airline Advertising Rule prevents airlines from advertising the 
breakdown of the cost of the air transportation, including taxes and 
government fees.129  The D.C. Circuit concluded that as the Airline 
Advertising Rule only requires that the total price be the prominently 
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displayed price, the rule was not an arbitrary or capricious exercise of 
the DOT’s authority to prevent unfair and deceptive practices.130 
Next, the D.C. Circuit addressed the airlines’ allegation that the 
Airline Advertising Rule violated their First Amendment rights.  The 
airlines argued that strict scrutiny should be applied, as the 
advertising of the airline prices, especially the associated government 
taxes and fees, was political speech.131  The D.C. Circuit determined 
that the advertising of airfares was not political speech, but 
commercial speech, as the speech referred to a specific product, 
airfare, and the airlines had economic motivations for the speech.132  
After determining the speech was commercial in nature, the D.C. 
Circuit analyzed the regulation of the speech using the Zauderer and 
Central Hudson frameworks.133  Under Zauderer, an “advertiser’s 
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are 
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers.”134  The Airline Advertising Rule does not prohibit 
airlines’ speech, but limits the manner in which airlines can advertise 
airfares by requiring the airlines to disclose and make prominent the 
total, final price.135  Applying Zauderer, the D.C. Circuit determined 
that this disclosure requirement is not only reasonably related to the 
government’s interest in preventing deception of consumers, but also 
a reasonable means of achieving this interest.136  Furthermore, the 
rule also satisfied the Central Hudson test.  The Central Hudson test 
requires that (1) the asserted government interest is substantial, (2) 
the regulation directly advances the asserted government interest, and 
(3) the means of achieving this interest are reasonable.137  The D.C. 
Circuit determined that the substantial government interest in this 
case was to ensure accuracy of commercial information in the 
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marketplace.138  Then applying the second and third factors, the D.C. 
Circuit determined that requiring the total, final price of airfare to be 
the most prominently displayed price not only directly advanced the 
government interest, but was a reasonable means of accomplishing 
the interest.139  Therefore, as the Airline Advertising Rule met both 
the Zauderer and Central Hudson frameworks, the rule did not violate 
the airlines’ First Amendment rights. 
The D.C. Circuit then addressed the airlines challenge to the 
Refund Rule.  This rule requires that airlines must allow consumers 
to cancel reservations without penalty for twenty-four hours if the 
consumers made reservations more than a week before the flight 
departure.140  The airlines argue that this rule violates the Airline 
Deregulation Act as it regulates airfares, and that it prevents the 
airlines from ensuring their planes are full.141  The D.C. Circuit 
rejected the airlines’ arguments determining that the Refund Rule 
does not regulate airfares, but regulates airline cancelation policies 
because existing cancellation policies were deceptive and unfair to 
consumers.142  The DOT examined existing airline customer service 
policies and determined that airlines’ cancelation policies in 
particular were routinely misleading and vague.143  The DOT 
determined that the vagueness and misleading nature of the policies 
was unfair and deceptive to customers, thus the DOT established the 
Refund Rule in order to establish industry norms for seats purchased 
more than a week in advance.144  The D.C. Circuit held that this rule 
was not an arbitrary or capricious as the Rule was a reasonable means 
to prevent unfair and deceptive practices.145 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit examined the Price Rule.  The Price 
Rule prevented airlines from increasing the price of seats, passenger 
baggage, or fuel surcharge after the air transportation had been 
purchased, except in the case of an increase in a government-imposed 
                                                          
138 Spirit Airlines, Inc., 687 F.3d. at 415. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 416. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Spirit Airlines, Inc., 687 F.3d. at 416. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-1 
 
462 
tax or fee.146  The airlines argue that this rule is procedurally 
unlawful, as the airlines had no notice that the DOT was intending to 
prohibit price increases for optional services after a passenger buys a 
ticket but before a passenger purchases the optional services.147  
Thus, the airlines argue that the DOT failed to give the airlines 
proper notice of the scope and general thrust of the proposed rule.148  
The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument and sided with the DOT’s 
view that increases in the price of air transportation, including 
increases in the price of seats, baggage, or applicable fuel surcharges, 
after the consumer purchased the airfare, constituted an unfair and 
deceptive policy.  Thus, this rule established reasonable, not arbitrary 
or capricious, industry guidelines to prevent these unfair and 
deceptive policies.149   
Having determined that all three of the challenged provisions of 
the DOT’s final rule entitled Enhancing Airline Passenger 
Protections were reasonable, procedurally lawful, and did not violate 
the airlines’ First Amendment rights, the D.C. Circuit denied the 
airlines petition for review of the DOT’s final rule.150 
 
Impact: 
 
 With this case, the D.C. Circuit reestablishes that the DOT has 
the authority to prohibit unfair and deceptive practices in the airline 
industry.  This case shows that this authority is broad in scope, and 
emphasizes that the DOT does not have to come up with the best or 
least restrictive policies, but only reasonable polices to prevent 
unfairness and deception.  As the case is limited to only three 
provisions of the DOT’s final rule entitled Enhancing Airline 
Passenger Protections, it is likely that the circuit courts, and possibly 
the Supreme Court, will be confronted with additional challenges to 
the DOT’s authority in the future. 
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Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d. 511 (5th Cir. 2012) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 The Orellana-Monson brothers, Jose and Andres, are El 
Savadoran citizens who entered the United States on October 22, 
2005.  The brothers were charged with entering the United States 
without having been admitted or paroled.  The Orellana-Monson 
brothers applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).  The brothers claimed that they 
qualified for asylum and withholding of removal as members in a 
particular social group, which feared future persecution.  However, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected their application.  
The brothers appealed the BIA’s decision to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s 
ruling finding that the brothers were ineligible for asylum or for 
withholding of removal, as they failed to qualify for membership in a 
particular social group for which they feared future persecution. 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling: 
 
 Jose and Andres Orellana-Monson were born in El Salvador.151  
A gang known as Mara 18 operates openly in El Salvador, and 
actively recruits young El Salvadoran males.152  While he was living 
in El Salvador, a local Mara 18 leader attempted to recruit, 11-year-
old Jose to the gang.153  Jose claims that when he refused to join the 
gang, the Mara 18 leader threatened to kill him and his family.154  
After this incident, Jose and his 8-year-old brother Andres fled to the 
United States.155  The brothers were charged with entering the United 
States without having been admitted or paroled.156  The Orellana-
Monson brothers claimed they were refugees eligible for asylum and 
for withholding of removal because they were being persecuted due 
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to their membership in a particular social group.157  Jose asserted that 
he was a member of a social group consisting of “Salvadoran males, 
ages 8 to 15, who have been recruited by Mara 18 but have refused to 
join due to a principled opposition to gangs.”158  Andres similarly 
asserted that he was a member of a social group consisting of 
“siblings of members of Jose’s social group, or alternatively, family 
members of Jose and that Mara 18 likely would impute Jose’s anti-
gang political opinion to him.”159  The brothers claimed that 
membership in these two social groups entitled them to asylum and 
withholding of removal. 
 First, an Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Jose and Andres 
were ineligible for asylum because the Salvadoran government was 
trying to control Mara 18, the brothers had not been persecuted, and 
the brothers did not qualify as members of a particular social group 
or assert any political opinions.160  The Orellana-Monson brother 
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals; however, the BIA 
determined that there was no evidence that the brothers had been 
persecuted.161  In this initial decision, the BIA did not consider 
whether the brothers belonged to a relevant social group for asylum 
purposes.162  The brothers then appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  The Fifth Circuit initially denied the 
petition for review, but after an additional petition for a panel 
rehearing, the Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments from the brothers.  
The Fifth Circuit then remanded the case back to the BIA requiring 
the BIA to evaluate the brother’s claim regarding being members of a 
protected social group entitled to asylum.163  On remand, the BIA 
determined that young Salvadoran males who rejected gang 
membership and their families did not “possess the social visibility 
and particularity to constitute membership in a particular social 
group” and that these alleged groups were overly broad.164  As the 
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brothers did not qualify for membership in a particular social group, 
the BIA found that the Orellana-Monson brothers failed to satisfy 
their burden of showing past persecution on an enumerated ground, 
and therefore were not entitled to a presumption of fear of future 
persecution.165  For all of these reasons, the BIA determined that the 
brothers did not qualify for asylum, and as withholding of removal 
has a higher standard of proof than asylum, the brothers also did not 
qualify for this standard of relief under the Convention Against 
Torture.166  The BIA dismissed the Orellana-Monson brother’s 
appeal, and the brother filed a second petition for review to the Fifth 
Circuit.167 
 The Fifth Circuit only reviewed the second BIA decision.  
Applying the Chevron standard, which gives deference to agency 
interpretations of the statutes they enforce, the Fifth Circuit first 
looked at whether the BIA’s interpretation of the CAT was 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”168  The 
Attorney General has the discretion to grant asylum to refugees, and 
a refugee is a defined as a person  
 
who is outside of his country and is unable or 
unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution, and who has 
demonstrated . . . membership in a particular social 
group or political opinion was or will be at least one 
central reason for the persecution.169 
 
A refugee must provide specific facts showing that he will be singled 
out for persecution, and persecution is defined as “the infliction of 
suffering or harm under government sanction, upon persons who 
differ in a way regarded as offensive.”170  Furthermore, in order to 
establish persecution based on membership in a particular group, as 
the Orellana-Monson brothers allege, they must show that they are 
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members of a group of persons who have common immutable 
characteristics that either cannot be changed or that they should not 
be required to change as the characteristic is fundamental to their 
individual identities.171  Thus, for asylum based on being a member 
of a particular social group, the Orellana-Monson brothers have to 
show that they are not only members of a particular social group, but 
that this membership is the cause of their persecution.  These 
definitions and requirements for asylum are very specific and 
establish a high burden; however, the requirements to qualify for 
withholding removal are even higher.172  As the standards for 
withholding removal are more difficult to establish, if the Orellana-
Monson brothers fail to meet the requirements for asylum, they will 
also fail to qualify for withholding removal. 
 With these definitions and requirements in mind, the Fifth Circuit 
reviewed the BIA’s ruling.  The key question for the Fifth Circuit is 
whether the BIA’s interpretation of the term “particular social 
group,” as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), is 
entitled to Chevron deference.173  The BIA determined that to qualify 
for asylum as a member of a particular social group, the social group 
must be both socially visible and particular.174  According to the BIA, 
social visibility refers to the extent to which members of society 
perceive individuals with common characteristics as member of the 
perceived social group.175  Moreover, particularity requires that the 
social group can be accurately described in a manner that 
differentiates the group and its members as a “discrete class of 
persons.”176  The BIA had previously rejected the argument that 
persons who resisted gang membership constituted a particular social 
group.177  The BIA determined that these individuals who resisted 
gang membership were neither socially visible enough nor particular 
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enough to constitute a particular social group under the asylum 
requirements.178   
 The Fifth Circuit had to review the BIA’s interpretation of social 
visibility and particularity as a matter of first impression in the 
circuit.179  After looking at unpublished cases and other circuit court 
decisions, the Fifth Circuit determined that the BIA’s interpretation 
of these two terms was entitled to Chevron deference.  Chevron 
required the Fifth Circuit to first look at whether the INA defined 
“particular social group,” and if the INA did not define this term, was 
the BIA’s interpretation permissible considering the construction of 
the statute.180  The first question was easily answered; the INA does 
not define the term “particular social group,” thus the Fifth Circuit 
turned to determine whether the BIA’s interpretation of the term was 
permissible.181 
 The Fifth Circuit determined that the BIA is entitled to use case-
by-case analysis to provide meaning to statutorily ambiguous terms 
such as the term “particular social group.”182  In this case, the BIA 
determined that the particular social groups the Orellana-Monson 
brothers alleged they were members of lacked both particularity and 
social visibility.  Jose argued that he was a member of a social group 
constituting Salvadoran males between ages 8 and 15 who had been 
recruited, but refused to join Mara 18.183  The BIA determined this 
group was overly broad as Mara 18 recruits from a wide cross section 
of society, and the only common trait individuals of this social group 
would share is their refusal to join the gang.184  This characteristic is 
not sufficiently particular to be singled out or even identified in El 
Salvadoran society.185  Furthermore, this social group also fails the 
social visibility requirement as there is no evidence to suggest that 
the social group Jose suggests would even be perceived as a group in 
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El Salvadoran society.186  It is more likely that these individuals who 
refused to join Mara 18 would be perceived in the same manner as 
any other member of society who was opposed to the gangs interests 
or who represents a threat to the gang.187   
Similarly, Andres argued that he was a member of a social groups 
consisting of young Salvadoran males who are siblings or family 
members of Jose’s social group.188  However, Andres’s group 
encompasses an even broader section of society than Jose’s group, as 
it refers to all of the family members of individuals who refused to 
join Mara 18.189  The BIA determined that if Jose’s alleged group 
was too broad to meet the particularity and social visibility 
requirements for asylum, then Andres’s even broader group must also 
fail, as its members would be even less particularized and less 
socially visible.190   
The Fifth Circuit determined that the BIA’s interpretation of the 
particularity and social visibility requirements for asylum were not 
arbitrary or capricious, but reasonable given the given the ambiguity 
of the term “particular social group” in the INA.191  Thus, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision that the Orellana-Monson 
brothers failed to meet the requirements for membership in a 
particular social group.192  As the brothers failed to qualify as 
members of a particular social group, they could not have a “well 
founded fear or persecution as a result of membership in such [a] 
group.”193  Therefore, the Orellana-Monson brothers were not 
eligible for asylum. 194  As the requirements for withholding removal 
are even more stringent than asylum, the Fifth Circuit determined 
that the brothers were not eligible for withholding removal either.195   
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Impact: 
 
 This decision established that the Fifth Circuit, and likely other 
circuits as well, will give deference to agency interpretations of 
statutes, as long as the interpretations are reasonable under the 
Chevron standard.  The case also provided the BIA with the authority 
to interpret any ambiguous terminology in the INA on a case-by-case 
basis.  This case-by-case application has the potential to allow for 
inconsistent or even contradictory BIA decisions depending on the 
manner in which the BIA chooses to interpret the terminology in 
each case.  Thus, the circuit courts, and possibly the Supreme Court, 
will likely be confronted with additional cases challenging the BIA’s 
interpretations of the INA’s terms. 
